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Abstract
Background: Previous empirical work among physicians has led us to propose that clinical practice is experienced
by clinicians as an engagement-in-the-clinical-situation. In this study, we pursue our exploration of clinical practice
‘on its own terms’ by turning to the experience of patients.
Methods: Phenomenological analysis of in-depth individual interviews with 8 patients.
Results: We describe the patient experience as a set of three motifs: the shock on the realization of the illness, the
chaos of the health care environment, and the anchor point provided by an engaged physician. We draw on Heidegger’s
notion of solicitude to show that patients are actively ascertaining the physician’s engagement in their care.
Conclusions: These findings lead us to question the classical “dual discourse” of medicine that offers a dichotomous
account of clinical practice as the addition of care to cure, art to science, humanism to technique, and person to medical
case. We found no such distinctions in our empirical investigation of clinical practice. Rather, in our synthesis, practice
appears as a unitary experience. The physician’s solicitude for the patient entrains engagement in the clinical situation.
Moreover, the solicitous, engaged physician constitutes an anchor point for the patient.
Keywords: Clinical practice, Patient experience, Hermeneutic phenomenology, Qualitative research
[…] we do not just want to know what virtue is, but to
know it in order to become good.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, On the Possibility of a
Philosophical Ethics ([1], p. 277)
Background
Common, though often implicit, understandings of clin-
ical practice frame it as applied medical science. In such
a view, the practitioner applies scientific knowledge of
the bodily processes of diseases and implements the spe-
cific strategies that have been demonstrated to be appro-
priate, usually on a base of statistical studies on groups
of individuals. In a sense, this can be considered an
idealistic approach to clinical medicine: truth is to be
found outside of practice itself, in the realm of abstract,
universal, scientific ideas. Moreover, if one defines
clinical medicine as an applied science, the question
arises as to how physicians should account for the hu-
manity of their patients. The “science” of medicine is
then seen to require a complementary “art” [2]. Such a
dual account of practice implies a sharp distinction be-
tween the domains of science (objective, rational, univer-
sal, value-free) and of the human (subjective, emotional,
relative, value-laden). This implicit understanding of
clinical medicine has been described as a “dual dis-
course” by medical anthropologists [3].
As such, the dual discourse has not been the object of
much criticism. It appears as a self-evident truth: medi-
cine as the addition of the science of the body and the
care of the person. Reasons to doubt the validity of the
dual discourse as an account of clinical practice can be
found outside of medicine. Notably, phenomenology and
anthropology have developed views of practice as em-
bodied, situated, and only partially conscious. This in-
vites practice to be understood “on its own terms” and
not as the application of theoretical rules [4].
As physicians, we find merit in such criticisms, and
the dual discourse appears to us a poor account of
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clinical practice. This was our motivation in initiating a
broad research program to study the nature of clinical
practice. Our initial step was an examination of clinical
medicine as an epistemic practice, using George Engel’s
biopsychosocial model as a lens [5]. Engel noted that
what he called “biomedicine” can be applied only to the
body. Yet, the actual epistemic object of clinical practice
is the patient; it therefore calls for a biopsychosocial
paradigm [6]. However, we noted two limitations of Eng-
el’s model. First, it is highly abstract and does not ac-
count for how a seasoned physician actually thinks, feels
and acts in practice. Second, for Engel, the patient is the
focal point of his model. That may result in an underap-
preciation of the physician’s biopsychosocial situation,
namely the context of clinical practice.
In response to these limitations, we decided to study, em-
pirically, clinical practice as a lived experience. In a first
study [7], we explored the lived experience of the physician
at work: specifically, how physicians think, feel and act in a
contextualized practice. The object under examination was
therefore clinical practice, defined as the experience of the
physician at work. We used a phenomenological approach
and worked with clinicians who had been selected by col-
leagues as ‘exemplary’ physicians. Our analysis led us to
propose that clinical practice is best understood as an
“engagement-in-the-clinical-situation.” Engagement pro-
vides an account of clinical practice as a unitary lived ex-
perience. Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis and
Sartre’s definition of the situation, we illustrated how this
novel perspective captures the physician in the clinical situ-
ation, including a context of materialities, procedures and
colleagues.
In this article, we present the results of a complemen-
tary empirical study. We explored the same object,
namely clinical practice, this time through the patient’s
lived experience of the physician at work. It seemed rele-
vant to include in our investigation the patient’s experi-
ence, as the patient is arguably the object of clinical
practice and, at the very least, a privileged witness. We
will proceed by first describing, in detail, this second
study, and then discussing how the findings of both
studies are related.
Methods
Our study is based on interviews with 8 “patients-as--
partners” affiliated with the Université de Montréal. The
concept of patient partnership is relatively new and war-
rants a description. A patient-as-partner is a person suf-
fering from a disease, usually severe and chronic, who is
actively engaged in his or her own care, but also, more
broadly, in institutional projects within academic and/or
healthcare organizations, in relation to teaching, re-
search, or various procedures [8]. More rarely, a
patient-as-partner is a close relative of the actual patient.
For our study on the physician’s experience, we had
chosen ‘expert physicians,’ recognized by their peers for
clinical excellence, experience, and capacity to reflect on
their own practice. Analogously, we chose to work with
patients-as-partners, who are, in a sense, ‘expert pa-
tients.’ Patients-as-partners are, or have been, confronted
with serious diseases. They have an extensive experience
of healthcare, and have had numerous different encoun-
ters with clinical practice. Positioning themselves as
partners of medical institutions, they are attentive wit-
nesses of medicine, engaged in a reflective process on
the nature of health care, and thus able to provide rich
accounts of their experience.
The participants were identified, approached by the ap-
propriate office at the Université de Montréal and pro-
vided informed consent. They received a modest
compensation for their time. The final sample included 3
women and 5 men, aged between 24 and 70 (see Table 1).
We conducted in-depth interviews (carried out by the
first author, a psychiatrist with 15 years of clinical experi-
ence, who was at the time a visiting professor at McGill
University). The first meetings explored in detail their
experiences of clinical practice, usually focusing on a
number of specific situations that carried particular
meanings for the participants. The follow-up interviews
further explored relevant issues and gathered reflections
and comments on the first interviews. The duration of
the meetings varied between 60′ and 105′ for the initial
interview and between 45′ and 75′ for the follow-up.
The interview process was exploratory in nature. In par-
ticular, the interviewer pointed out contradictions when
they appeared, inviting participants to clarify and further
elaborate on their experience. We underline that the
participants were evoking past events as they remem-
bered them during the interview. We considered that
the manner in which they described the events was indi-
cative of their experience of the events at the time.
Moreover, they were reflecting, with the interviewer, on
their experiences, adding to the richness and the com-
plexity of the material.
For the analysis, we adopted a qualitative descriptive ap-
proach with a “phenomenological overtone,” as outlined
Table 1 Participants
Virginia Locally invasive tumor of the orbital floor
Nathalie Systemic lupus erythematosus
Jacques Chronic lymphoma
Josué Crohn’s disease
Antoine Cystic fibrosis
Esther Breast cancer; husband with Alzheimer’s disease
Patrick Son with congenital renal insufficiency
Pierre Type 1 diabetes with multiple complications
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by Sandelowski [9]. Working on the participants’ narra-
tives, we aimed to capture their experiences of the phys-
ician at work. We proceeded inductively, identifying
segments of the material that constituted units of mean-
ing, which led us, through repeated discussions, to a con-
sensus on three synthetic motifs. They provided a
reasonable and structured account of the whole material
with regard to our object of inquiry.1
The study protocol was approved by the institutional re-
view board of the McGill University Faculty of Medicine.
Results
A tale of stormy seas and safe anchors
In this section we make the case that patients experience
clinical practice as an anchor point offered by an en-
gaged physician. The anchor point takes its meaning
against the backdrop of the shock of the illness and the
chaos of the health care environment. We present these
findings in a sequence, a meta-narrative which helps to
underline how they interact dynamically. We stress that
all the individual interviews did not necessarily follow
this precise structure. Nonetheless, the three motifs link
sequentially, providing a faithful integrated account of
the individual narratives. The coherence between this ac-
count, comprising the three identified motifs, and the
participants’ individual stories, argues for the findings’
relevance.
We illustrate our findings using direct quotes from the
interviews.2
The shock
In the participants’ narratives, there was often an initial
shock. The shock can affect the body—the experience of
a painful, failing, unresponsive body. For instance, for
Nathalie:
During the Christmas period I was in an extreme
fever, I had a loss of weight, I wasn’t eating anymore,
really an extreme weight loss, I had pains, I would
wake up perspiring, my mother had to put ice on me.
I wasn’t living with my parents but I spent the entire
holiday period at my parents, my mother would put
cream on me because I was hurting everywhere and
then in January I began my PhD and I was happy. I
had no more pain anywhere, and one week later I
was… I was falling asleep while the teachers were
reading the syllabus. I was unable to keep awake,
unable to move and so one weekend my mother told
me: “Nathalie, what are you doing? Are you spending
Monday on the sofa, what are you doing? Will you go
to your lecture or will you stay forever on the sofa?”
And so on Sunday night I went to the hospital, I
arrived in extreme fatigue with a body hurting to the
highest degree, I was unable to move when I went to
the hospital. I couldn’t get out of bed, go to the
bathroom, I was… my hands were so cramped, if you
want, that I couldn’t wipe myself, I was in a state, I
wouldn’t say of degradation but almost.
The shock can be caused by a single word: “tumor,”
“cancer,” “surgery”—an announcement that tears apart
the existential fabric. For Virginia, it is a benign tumor
of a facial bone, locally invasive and quite large. The
shock comes from her otolaryngologist, who is, in her
words, “so kind, so warm, so reassuring, so sensitive,
whose gaze is so trustworthy.” Yet, as he describes the
surgery and the risk to the optic nerve, the shock is her
sudden, overwhelming thought: “Oh my God, I will lose
my eye, this is over.”
Sometimes the shock is less overt, perhaps a story hid-
den within another story. Antoine, who suffers from
end-stage respiratory failure, learns that he needs not
only a lung transplant, but a double, lung-liver trans-
plant, the first to be performed in the region. When he
visits the liver transplant clinic, he is “stunned” that the
young resident does not seem to know anything about
his complex medical situation. This “stunning” encoun-
ter can also be understood as an echo of the previous
shock of learning about the necessity of a double trans-
plant. Jacques, who has been diagnosed with a lymph-
oma, is “shocked” that the oncologist does not invite his
wife to participate in the consultation. But, quite likely,
the shock is also that he, a senior administrator of that
very same hospital, must now become a patient and
finds himself forced to entrust his care to this intimidat-
ing physician.
We do not claim that patients always experience ill-
ness as a dramatic “shock.” An apparently minor disrup-
tion can still be significant. For example, learning that
one must take an anti-hypertensive drug daily, perhaps
forever, may seem routine to a physician, yet can be up-
setting to a patient by signaling the limits and ineluct-
able decline of the body.
The shock is a catastrophe, current or impending, that
strikes the participants’ most intimate selves. Edmund
Pellegrino [10] described disease as an “assault on the
ontological unity of body and self”, underlining that it
strikes at the very being of the person (p. 44). Kurt Gold-
stein [11] spoke of a “shock and danger for existence” (p.
329), manifest in “catastrophic reactions” to the ordinary
milieu, in which the patient is “buffeted, and vacillating
[, experiencing] a shock affecting not only his own per-
son, but the surrounding world as well” (p. 49). This
very real and material danger is the continuing backdrop
against which the whole clinical experience unfolds. In-
deed, the shock is also the trigger of subsequent events.
Existence seems to fold and redeploy in a new, very dif-
ferent way. Actions must be taken; help must be sought.
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The person transforms into a patient and enters the
“health care system” [12]. Thus begins the second stage
of the tale.
Chaos
In the words of Nathalie, entering health care is ventur-
ing into a chaotic world:3
It’s chaotic. When students ask me, when they pose
the question: “But how is it? Really?”—this is chaos,
you’re entering into chaos.
The participants experience the health care environ-
ment as unresponsive and absurd, to a degree reminiscent
of the worlds of Franz Kafka and Lewis Carroll. Examples
in our material abound; we provide one from Josué:
I would call; that was a rotating personnel so it wasn’t
always the same person who would set the
appointments and they had no clue about my name,
or anything […] when I called my surgeon it was
voicemail upon voicemail and then, I talk to I don’t
really know who, who’s in an office I don’t know
really where; and they, I don’t know if they are able to
see the surgeon, if they’re able to transmit the
message… I guess it’s only an appointments-desk. So,
if I have a problem, there’s no one in that hospital for
me.
[…] I got myself there and they didn’t even know why
I was there […] I got myself there two or three times
for nothing. They would look at me, and tell me: “I
don’t know why you’re here, I can’t examine you.” […]
I had a surgeon who was examining me for an open
wound that should heal. And at a certain moment
when the wound was stagnating, and he couldn’t close
it, he told me: “I’ll have you meet a plastic surgeon
who will fill it up.” When I came to see the plastic
surgeon, he examined me and told me: “I don’t
understand what the surgeon wants me to do. I don’t
know what to do with your case, I’ll talk to him and
you’ll come back in three weeks.” When I returned
three weeks later, he hadn’t talked to the surgeon, he
didn’t have any more ideas on my case.
In the chaos, people cannot be reached, or, when they
are, they cannot answer the questions asked. When un-
foreseen events happen, they are minimized or even de-
nied, as when Virginia wakes up after her surgery to find
out that the surgeon has used fatty tissue to fill in a def-
icit in her left orbital floor:
When I woke up, in my hospital bed, there were four
friends of mine and my parents. And they were staring at
me, all six, with… you know… looking all traumatized. I
couldn’t understand why, and then, I don’t remember
who… one of the six said: “Don’t panic, you know, but
you have [laughs] a hole in your head.”
Subsequently, furious at what had happened, and espe-
cially that she had not been forewarned that it might
happen, she quarrels with the resident. Later that same
day, when the surgeon comes to see her, he insists that
he had warned her.
Dangerous decisions
However, this chaotic world is not only difficult to navi-
gate, unresponsive and apparently absurd—it is fraught
with the danger of mistaken clinical interventions. Deci-
sions are made and actions taken, seemingly coming
from nowhere, for no apparent reason. For instance, one
Friday night, two residents announce to Nathalie that
mycophenolate, her treatment since the diagnosis of a
severe auto-immune condition, will be stopped and re-
placed by cyclophosphamide. The decision had been
made by the chief immunologist on the ward without
any discussion with her, he was not there to discuss it
now, and the residents were unable to explain the ra-
tionale for the change. For Nathalie, this is an example
of a physician who does not engage in what she calls an
“egalitarian relationship,” a “partnership” with the pa-
tient: the immunologist is taking the decision all by him-
self, without any discussion with her. However, the
problem here is not only one of discussing and sharing
the clinical decision or, more broadly, proper “bedside
manner” [13]. The problem, for Nathalie, is above all
that cyclophosphamide is toxic, and might have negative
repercussions on her fertility, an issue she had discussed
at length with her nephrologist. They had agreed that it
should remain an option of last resort. Two things,
therefore, need to be distinguished. First, is an issue, al-
most political, of power balance in the clinic, in that the
immunologist takes a decision “about her without her”
[14]. Second, and most importantly for Nathalie, is that
the immunologist makes a decision that might well be a
bad decision for her, a decision putting her in danger.
Indeed, in Nathalie’s narrative, it was clearly a poor deci-
sion, as she refused the therapeutic change, remained on
mycophenolate, and improved.
Chaos is not limited to unfortunate problems of coord-
ination, communication or management, the result of
organizational difficulties among well-intentioned profes-
sionals. Physicians themselves contribute to this sense of
chaos, insofar as their decisions appear at times noncha-
lant, incomprehensible, and possibly dangerous. What is
most important is that the chaotic situation is one of dan-
ger, a very material danger for the patient. In contrast to
Carroll’s seemingly invulnerable Alice, patients are indeed
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extremely vulnerable. Our participants’ diseases were ser-
ious, requiring demanding treatments. The clinical deci-
sion, this surgery, that prescription, a transfer to another
hospital or clinic, the decision to be placed on the organ
recipients list, the errors, the conflicts, the misunderstand-
ings—these can all have grave clinical consequences.
Walking on eggshells
The situation is made worse by the fear that the physician
might get upset if the patient protests or asks for explana-
tions. The physician is making decisions that might be
dangerous, but there is also danger in questioning them.
Participants often described how they attempted to appear
as “good patients,” lest they be perceived as “bitchy pa-
tients,” as Nathalie said. This is the danger for Patrick,
whose 3 year-old son has been on dialysis for a mysterious
disease since birth. The boy had already undergone more
than 30 surgeries; the dialyses were becoming more and
more difficult and his life was at stake. To say the least, it
was a very dramatic situation. Patrick wishes to seek a sec-
ond opinion on the advisability of a renal transplant:
Patrick: […] at that moment I suggested to the doctor,
“Is it be possible to check with Hospital X, to have
them, without necessarily going to Hospital X, but go
ask them, send them the file and see what they think
and what they would suggest?” and on and on and on.
And this physician was, I was a bit afraid to talk to
her about that, I didn’t want to offend her.
Interviewer: Why were you afraid of this?
Patrick: Because in the relationship I still have with
the physicians, it is somewhat of a relationship where
they have the last word on my son’s condition, they
are the ones keeping him alive, you understand. It’s
we who do the work around this but at some point
my son’s life is in their hands. Me, what I really didn’t
want was to antagonize a physician. I didn’t want to
get to the point where they don’t like my face; that
would make things more difficult, and then I would
tend to seriously question what they do or don’t do,
whether they do what they should, because there
would be this tension of whether they do… well—I
wanted to avoid this at all cost. […]
Interviewer : You were anxious…
Patrick: Very anxious, I discussed this with my partner,
and then we came to the conclusion that we had no
choice… look, it’s my son’s life, he will come first.
[…] these are difficult decisions, that keep us awake at
night, and we don’t always agree, my partner and I
[…] before going to see… we discussed a lot […] we
both had the same fear [of the doctor’s reaction].
These parents, who were going through such an ordeal
with their son, were agonizing and arguing at night
about whether it might be dangerous to ask the phys-
ician for a second opinion. In this case, the fear was in-
deed misplaced, as the physician responded with
kindness (and tears, as we will discuss below) to their re-
quest. Nevertheless, it illustrates how intensely patients
sometimes fear the reactions of health care professionals.
“Walking on eggshells” is an exercise in caution, the
painful necessity that comes with disease, illustrating
how dealing with a chaotic health care environment and
unreliable health care professionals can heighten the dis-
tress caused by illness and its consequences. Many
health care professionals probably do not appreciate, let
alone acknowledge, the specific distress they can induce
in patients. Indeed, physicians have a tendency to take
for granted that the patients will trust them, and to posit
trust as a condition of clinical care [15]. In our material,
trust was rather a result, the result of finding a physician
providing an anchor point in the existential and situ-
ational tempest that the patient was facing. This is our
third finding, discussed below, that points to the proper
nature of clinical practice.
The anchor point
Finding connection and the medical “chalet”
In some interviews, participants described specific mo-
ments where they found a sense of connection with the
physician. It could be an instant where they perceived
tears in the physician’s eyes, a glimpse of the “person”
behind the “professional.” It could be a way of looking at
them “in the eyes.” It could be a promise to call back,
and a promise kept. Nathalie tells of a very evocative in-
stance of such connection:
At that moment this fellow enters the hospital
room and tells me, “well now, we’ll meet in two
weeks, the biopsy should arrive”—because I had
had a biopsy, so “The biopsy should arrive within
ten days, but we’ll meet in two weeks, in two
weeks, we’ll review the results.” And then I look at
him and say, “Ah, it’s you the physician we were
waiting for.” And he said yes. “Is it you who will
be my physician?” I’m very naïve, I’m excessively ill,
“will you be my physician?” […] I ask him, “Is it
you I will see outside?” and he said yes. I say,
“Then you’re the one who’s stuck with me?”, and
he looks at me and he says, “No, it’s you the one
who’s stuck with me”, and there was this little
moment when we both laughed; he signed a paper
and he went away.
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Thereafter, for Nathalie, the hospital will lose some of
that chaotic quality:
My three first years, the hospital was my chalet—I
went to the hospital for respite. It was a safe place for
me despite the infections and the missed medication.
If the hospital, previously chaotic, is now a safe
“chalet,” it is because of that same physician. Indeed, the
safety of the “chalet” remains fragile, at risk of going
‘helter-skelter:’
I said to my father, “Dad, go see his secretary on the
2nd floor and let him know that I am currently
admitted” […] I needed to be sure that he knew I was
there, I needed to be sure that it wouldn’t go haywire.
It was indeed Nathalie who spoke of an “anchor
point”:
I remember that he was really my anchor point, it was
he, the person I trusted—that I trusted most in the
world at that moment. When I talked to him, I had
such a trust in that man, for everything.
All participants described a specific physician, and
sometime more than one, as providing such an anchor
point. They evoked these experiences with words such
as “humanity” and “partnership.” Nathalie described
what constitutes, for her, a “good physician,” insisting on
humanity and respect, and what she called an “egalitar-
ian relationship.” In a slightly different tone, Virginia
underlined her otolaryngologist’s “empathy.” In the inter-
view, she described him as “reassuring.” However, he has
just announced that she will need surgery and she is
thinking, “My God, I will lose my eye,” which is not
exactly a reassuring thought. The interviewer confronts
her with the contradiction:
Interviewer: Yet you were rather very worried?
Virginia: Yes, yes, I was very worried.
Interviewer: What did you mean then, when you said,
“reassuring?”
Virginia: You know, at that moment, that was not a
moment when I was reassured. It was rather a moment…
it’s more the way it was transmitted, you know. It’s just
the fact of demonstrating sensibility, warmth, empathy. I
find it played a big role you know. Because, when I think
back, in retrospect, yes, it was very anxiogenic for me, I
had a crisis in his office and all. It was really, it was a
shock. At least, at least I felt he had empathy for me. I
didn’t feel… you know, I felt like a human being… not
like… like in plastic surgery, like a puppet.
Virginia is insisting on the physician’s warmth, empathy,
or perhaps simple kindness. Similar notions were present
in many interviews: the physician as an anchor point was
described as treating patients as human beings and not
objects, respecting their desires and priorities, informing
them transparently, and establishing something of a closer,
warmer, less strictly “professional” relationship with them.
At this point, it may seem that our material faithfully
echoes what has been described as the “dual discourse” of
contemporary medicine: the idea that patients need not
only to be ‘cured,’ but also ‘cared for,’ that empathy is
needed in addition to technoscientific competence.
However, we will argue that this is a somewhat super-
ficial understanding of our participants’ narratives. They
did not describe experiences of good clinical practice as
ones in which ‘care’ was added to ‘cure.’ Rather, the issue
is whether the physician is really ‘doing the job.’
Doing the job
We have now reached a crucial, and perhaps complicated
point in our argument. It is commonly accepted that em-
pathy, warmth, respect, a humane attitude, are good
things in themselves, expected to somehow help, and “re-
assure” the patient. Indeed, such received wisdom is also
present in our participants’ narratives. However, as we
delved more deeply in our participants’ descriptions dur-
ing the interviews, and revisited these issues in our ana-
lyses, we arrived at a rather different understanding.
Let us begin with the idea of the “reassuring” phys-
ician. For instance, taking seriously Virginia’s claim that
her otolaryngologist was reassuring to her, even though
he was announcing that she might lose her eye, one is
left wondering—how so? How might a response of
“warmth and empathy” to Virginia’s terror be reassuring?
It does not make sense if the fear that is assuaged is that
of losing an eye. After all, “warmth and empathy” is not
a promise that her eye will be spared. The fear that the
physician seems to be able to allay, at least to some ex-
tent, cannot be the loss of her eye. Asked to elaborate
further on her otolaryngologist, whom she contrasts
with the plastic surgeon who would visit her only once
or twice during a 2-week hospitalization, Virginia notes:
You know, just by demonstrating that he worries
about his patients […] asking how you’re doing, first,
but looking in the eyes and really showing that he’s
worried and that it’s important that I get better and all.
In a similar vein, Jacques also states during the inter-
view that it makes him “feel secure” that his physician,
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“beyond the scientific,” is also interested in him “as a
person.” The interviewer invites him to explain further:
how would an interest in him “as a person” make him
“feel secure?”
When I see the effort that is being made to establish
this interpersonal relationship […] The big difference
is that by explaining what was going on… well…
“here’s what will happen, here are the possible
reactions, I have studied your case well.”
Jacques tells us that he finds it “extraordinary” that
such a specialist has taken a whole hour to discuss the
diagnosis and therapy with his family. When he explores
with us why it should be reassuring that there is an
interest in him as a person, he mentions the physician’s
“efforts” and the fact that he has “studied his case well.”
Patrick does not talk specifically of fear, but describes
his intense relief when he sees the tears in the eyes of
his son’s nephrologist, as she cries when they request a
second opinion, the very issue he had been discussing so
intensely with his partner. The interviewer invites him
to explore that memory, asking why the tears had been
so important:
At one moment I remember, she was sitting at the
end of the table with us and she started to cry, you
know, with my wife and all, and I perceived that she,
over there, she really cares […] it wasn’t going well for
my son and she had accompanied us through all the
steps at Hospital X, and all the discussions we had at
that moment, the fact that she helped us with all the
documentation, she explained to us… we spent quite
some time, which we hadn’t done beforehand. It
showed how dear my son was to her. Throughout the
discussions, at a certain point, I don’t remember what
we were saying at that moment, but in essence it was
like, “well, there’s not much more to do for my son
and we’re going to let him go.” We were talking about
all that and she started to cry. I saw—you know I had
always thought she was detached and all; and I could
see that it was really affecting her.
Patrick is moved by the nephrologist’s tears because
they are a testimony, for him, of the importance his son
really has for her. The time she took to prepare the file
and to accompany the parents in their quest for a second
opinion is a further proof that she cares deeply about his
son (in French: “elle a réellement mon fils à coeur”).
It seems that the worry shared by Virginia, Jacques
and Patrick, is that the physician might not really care
about the patient, might not do his best to cure the pa-
tient. This is how physicians are reassuring: when pa-
tients sense that they really care about them. In the
participants’ description, the physician experienced as an
anchor point is someone to whom they are important,
who worries about them, who cries at the idea of bad
things happening to them, who roots for them. It is not
a complete reassurance; patients are still worried about
the outcome of the treatment, the disease, etc. But one
specific fear is allayed, that of being treated by physi-
cians who are not really doing their best, not really
doing their job.
We also wish to underline that Jacques wants his phys-
ician to study his case well. In the dual discourse, the pa-
tient “as a person” is often opposed to the patient “as a
case”—as if a physician who sees the patient “as a case”
cannot see the patient “as a person.” But Jacques is actu-
ally reassured that his oncologist sees him “as person,
beyond the scientific”, because it means that he will
“have studied his case well.” Being properly treated as
the physician’s case is rooted in being seen by that phys-
ician as a person. In that perspective, a human relation-
ship, in which the patient is considered as a person, is a
means to the broader end of receiving proper care by se-
curing the physician’s commitment. In other words, in
the experience of the anchor point, the “case” and the
“person” are like two faces of the same coin.
In sharp contrast with the negligent and prickly phys-
ician of the chaotic environment, who appears so de-
tached from the clinical situation, our participants find
an anchor point in a physician for whom it is important
that they get better, who will see them as his or her
“case.” Being a case, not the only case, but a unique case,
for one physician, who is not the only physician, but a
unique physician: that is to say, being taken care of, be-
ing the object of the physician’s dedication, diligence,
and best efforts. As they reflect on their relationships
with physicians, patients search for signs of such a com-
mitment. For Nathalie, it is manifest in the physician’s
strangely symmetrical response: “No, it’s you the one
who’s stuck with me.” For Patrick, it is evident in the ne-
phrologist’s tears. For Jacques, it is the time taken to
meet with his family. For Josué, it is the reliability of his
specialist who follows up on things.
A counter-example
We provide here one final excerpt that is a negative il-
lustration of the anchor point. It clarifies what is at stake
here: not only the quality of the relationship but, more
broadly, adequate care. Virginia is sharing with the inter-
viewer her anger when she wakes up after a surgery and
discovers that the surgeon has performed a graft of adi-
pose tissue that he had not previously discussed with
her; her autonomy has not been respected; she feels like
an object, “a puppet” in the surgeon’s hands. In the ini-
tial description of the scene, she mentioned that the resi-
dent had tried to trivialize the consequence of the graft,
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telling her it would be corrected easily later on with
minor surgery involving a liposuction. The interviewer
reminds her of the resident:
Interviewer: […] when you wake up… your anger, I’m
wondering, what is feeding your anger?
Virginia: […] because I had not been warned, and
then there is the other element I’ve mentioned,
because I have the impression of being just a body,
deprived of rights over my body, without having been
asked. It was very much this I returned to, when I saw
the resident. It was always, “We didn’t talk about that,
he never said he would do that.”
Interviewer: But the resident, what did he say?
Virginia: […] Yes, about the liposuction yes, and that
reinforced my anger.
[…] Interviewer: that meant one more surgery.
Virginia: Yes it’s true. Yes. That was part of it, I was
just telling myself, “You don’t realize how much […]
how much energy and resources it takes, for me, to
prepare for each operation […] You don’t realize.”
[…] Interviewer: You’re thinking, maybe they took
that decision a bit lightly. For them it’s not so much.
Virginia: Yes. For them it’s not so much. That’s it.
Interviewer: For them it’s not so much, for you it is a
lot. […] And you would like to be certain that, if they
took that decision, they did so knowing how much it
would cost you […] and the fact that he had not
discussed this beforehand, that leads to this question.
Virginia: Yes. That’s exactly true.
As Virginia elaborates on her experience, it appears
that the problem was not simply that she had not been
forewarned, that her right to be informed and to make a
decision about her treatment had not been respected.
She knew that this was a complex reconstructive sur-
gery, after a bone tumor and an infection. The surgeon
could not know in advance what he was going to face
during surgery. The problem, so painful and infuriating
for her, was that she could not be sure the surgeon had
made the best possible decision. Perhaps he did not
know, or did not want to take into account, how difficult
it was going to be for her to undergo another procedure.
She realized that perhaps there was no other choice, and
if so, she was mature enough to accept the necessity of
the additional surgery, the liposuction to fill up the “hole
in her head.” In all likelihood, if the resident had demon-
strated that the surgical team had taken that decision
after careful consideration of the consequences, acknow-
ledging that the necessity of another surgery was bad
news, instead of minimizing it, it would have been ac-
ceptable. Even if she had not been forewarned. What
was unacceptable was the idea that the surgeon may
have taken his decision lightly, an idea made worse by
the resident’s minimization of the surgery: “for them it is
not much.” For her, each operation is an ordeal. It is
reminiscent of Nathalie’s immunologist prescribing the
cyclophosphamide perhaps not knowing, or not wanting
to take into account, her desire to have a child one day.
These are physicians who appear as failing to give
proper, careful consideration to the patient’s existential
situation.
In summary, this is where our discussion has led us
thus far: clinical practice is experienced, by the patients,
as an anchor point in the chaos that follows the shock of
illness. However, as we stated in the introduction, the
current study is situated in a research project with a
broader scope, designed to explore clinical practice. This
included an empirical description of the physicians’ ex-
perience of clinical practice as engagement-in-the-clini-
cal-situation. We now want to bring together the results
of the two studies.
Discussion
Engagement and solicitude
We first refine our description of the patients’ experi-
ence by turning to Heidegger’s notion of solicitude,4
which, we believe, offers some support to, and clarifica-
tion of, what is at stake for the patient in the clinical
situation. Heidegger draws a number of useful distinc-
tions: relating to objects or relating to human beings,
engaging the other with “deficient” or “positive” solici-
tude, by “leaping-in” or “leaping-ahead.” We will discuss
them as they pertain to the clinical situation, and in light
of our empirical material.
In section 26 of Being and Time [16], Heidegger con-
trasts our experience of things, material objects, with
our experience of other human beings. Things present
to us as possibilities of, or impediments to, our actions,
what Heidegger calls their handiness. In the clinical situ-
ation, the patient may well appear to the physician as
one object among others. The patient is handy; present-
ing to the physician as possibilities of and impediments
to medical actions. For instance, the physician may be
looking for symptoms in the anamnesis or for a handy
vein for insertion of a catheter. Indeed, there may be
some merit in the capacity of the physician to engage
the patient as a “thing-at-hand,” relating, in Heidegger’s
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words, with circumspection and concern, characteristic of
our dealing with “things-at-hand.”
The other human being—the other “Dasein”—is not en-
countered as a thing-at-hand, but as “Mitdasein”: a Dasein
present to another Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein is funda-
mentally, or structurally, “Mitsein,” being-with. We are exist-
entially aware that the other is a human being, that we share
this particular condition of being human; therefore, we live
in a world that is, fundamentally, a human world. Concern,
“Besorge,” determines our approach to things-at-hand; in
contrast, the other human being, as a human being, calls for
solicitude, “Fürsorge.” In the clinical situation, the patient is
not only a “thing-at-hand,” but also another Dasein, and the
physician is approaching the patient not only with concern,
but also with solicitude. However, Heidegger states that, in
our being with others, we “initially and most often” hold to
“deficient modes” of solicitude: we lose ourselves in the in-
difference of the ‘they’ (“das Man”), passing-one-another-by,
not-mattering-to-one-another, being without-one-another.
The other human being is perceived as a human being, be-
cause the very structure of Dasein is being-with—but the
perception is resisted, ignored, disavowed. This is, we be-
lieve, an account of what our participants describe as the
chaos, the experience of physicians not providing an anchor
point.
The sense of finding an anchor point is a response to a
“positive” mode of solicitude. In authentic solicitude, the
fact of the patient’s humanity is not negated but ac-
knowledged. It seems that, for the patient, this is the
condition of proper care. Therefore, the patient is striv-
ing to emerge from the ‘they’, the anonymous crowd of
all patients, prompting the physician to enter in a posi-
tive, rather than deficient, mode of solicitude. In order
to do so, the patient must establish some sort of per-
sonal connection with the physician, as Nathalie did
when she addressed the nephrologist: “Are you the one
who’s stuck with me?” However, there is danger in such
an attempt, because the physician might react with
anger; therefore, patients are treading a fine line, walking
on eggshells.
A physician who does the best for the patient is also
one who understands what is best for the patient. In-
deed, Heidegger further discusses solicitude by contrast-
ing “leaping-in” and “leaping-ahead.” In leaping-in, one
is intruding on the other’s freedom and existence as Da-
sein; the excessive solicitude attempts to dislodge the
other’s preoccupation, which is the very hallmark of Da-
sein, of being human. Such a relationship is one of intru-
sion, suggestive of something like a clumsy paternalism.
If Virginia’s otolaryngologist had responded, to her real-
istic fear of losing her eye, with words such as “Don’t
worry, you will be fine”, he would have been leaping-in.
In contrast, when leaping-ahead, one accompanies the
other, keeping open a space of freedom for the other’s
existence, who is fully recognized as another human be-
ing.5 Leaping-ahead requires considerateness (Rücksicht)
and indulgence (Nachsicht). Too much considerateness
and too little indulgence lead to leaping-in. Too little
considerateness and too much indulgence lead to the in-
difference of the ‘they.’ When the nephrologist replies,
“no, you’re the one who’s stuck with me,” he is not
leaping-in, robbing Nathalie of her preoccupation; he is
leaping-ahead, passing the ball to her, giving her some
space and respecting her preoccupation. His response is
not a “don’t worry, you will be fine,” it is rather a “we’re
in this together.”
Here is Nathalie, trying to describe such a considerate
and indulgent “leaping-ahead”:
A good physician would be someone who uses his
knowledge and experience with the aim of supporting
the patients. He supports them on their path. It is not
a knowledge that you have innately, that you are using
to show that you know things—it is to support and
help the patients. A good physician for me respects
his own humanity and respects his patients’ humanity.
Who gets back to the basics. We’re two human
beings, we’re both going to die. One has knowledge
that will help me not to die.
To summarize, the patient presents to the physician
both as a thing-at-hand and as a human being. In the
health care environment, solicitude may be deficient. In
that case, the patient is mostly a thing-at-hand. Being a
thing-at-hand is dangerous, because it seems that, for
our participants, it does not lead to adapted, diligent, en-
gaged care. For such proper care, solicitude is needed. In
other words, clinical practice embraces both the pa-
tient’s handiness and the patient as Dasein. However,
Heidegger suggests, the danger then is one in which
solicitude is leaping-in: a situation in which the phys-
ician acknowledges that the patient is another human
being, but then “leaps in” and acts in the stead of the
patient. When the physician is leaping-ahead, the pa-
tient is able to discern an anchor point, thereby re-
lieved to some extent, from the burden of ascertaining
the physician’s solicitude—reasonably confident that
the physician will “study his case well,” as Jacques said,
and do the best.
The clinical situation
By integrating the results from the two studies, we
propose that the patient experiences the physician’s
engagement-in-the-clinical-situation as solicitude; this is
constitutive of the anchor point. Our characterization of
the physicians’ experiences finds its complement and
validation in our analysis of the patients’ material. When
patients are looking for manifestation of solicitude, they
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are ascertaining the physician’s engagement in their clin-
ical situation. Thus, our two empirical studies, though
conducted independently, provide mutually reinforcing
insights on the nature of clinical practice.
Solicitude on the one hand, engagement on the other;
however, the experience is not symmetrical. For the
patient, the physician’s solicitude is a condition of
proper, diligent, committed care—but it is uncertain.
The patient may therefore deploy active strategies
(not necessarily conscious) to verify, secure, and
sometimes elicit the physician’s solicitude. This is not
to say that the patient cannot experience solicitude
for the clinician—indeed, it is very common in prac-
tice. But we would argue that the clinical situation
for the patient is fundamentally centered on this issue
of the clinician’s solicitude—while the converse is not
true: the situation for the clinician is centered, or ra-
ther, as we will argue, gathered around the patient’s
medical needs.
Our understanding of the clinical situation draws on
Jean-Paul Sartre [17], who argued, following other phe-
nomenological critiques of the classical, sharp dichot-
omy between subject and world, that the situation of a
subject captures both the situation, “things themselves,”
and the subject “myself among things”. As we argued in
our previous article, “things themselves” include the ma-
terialities of the situation, but also the broader context:
procedures and apparatuses, knowledge about diseases,
colleagues and nurses, the family, the hour of the day
and the day of the week and the season, his or her own
past experiences and mentors, etc. The situation is a
space of interrelations, and the patient is one among the
“things themselves,” but a very particular one. In good
clinical practice, the situation is pulled towards the
patient, who constitutes the center of gravity of the
situation. Another metaphor is the magnetic North:
the physician’s solicitude orients the situation and the
clinical acts towards the patient. Whereas engagement
describes the practical, concrete nature of the physi-
cian’s involvement in the situation, solicitude reaches
out to the patient. As the physician is gathering the
situation around the patient, the patient in turn is
attempting to become the focal point of the situation
for the gaze of the physician. This is done by
attempting to establish a human relationship, that is,
by appearing to, and being recognized by the phys-
ician, as a human being, and thereby securing solici-
tude and engagement.
Conclusions
Our results undermine the conceptual validity of the “dual
discourse” in medicine. The dual discourse has been iden-
tified by medical anthropologists [3] and describes clinical
practice as the sum of two distinct components:
Physicians must be competent; they should also
embody caring qualities. “Competence” is associated
with the language of the basic sciences, with “value-
free” facts and knowledge, skills, techniques, and
“doing” or action. “Caring” is expressed in the
language of values, or relationships, attitudes,
compassion, and empathy, the nontechnical or […]
“personal” aspect of medicine. (p. 91)
The theoretical knowledge of the biomedical sciences
and the statistical approaches of “evidence-based” medi-
cine constitute the “scientific” component of clinical
medicine, characterized by the supposedly rational, ob-
jective and value-neutral principles of technoscience. Its
object is the body and the disease. But because this is
considered too narrow a definition of medicine’s task, a
second component is added to the first, in order to ac-
count for the patient as a human person. The dual dis-
course is indeed fueled by recurrent criticisms of
medicine as a dehumanized and dehumanizing enter-
prise (see [18, 19] for classical examples; [20, 21] for re-
cent ones; [22] for a historical perspective).
The dual discourse account of practice appears, simul-
taneously and paradoxically, to be self-evident and very
abstract. Self-evident, because the notion of medicine as
dealing with diseases is seductive; and once that is estab-
lished, the necessity of a complementary notion of hu-
mane care seems obvious. Abstract, because this
addition of components is not what clinical practice feels
like, neither to the physicians, nor to the patients. These
complementary abstractions, medicine cures diseases,
and medicine cares for human beings, are reminiscent of
Husserl’s epistemological critique of positivism [23]. In-
deed, we believe that our phenomenological description
constitutes a more faithful account of clinical practice as
a unitary lived experience. The dual discourse of medi-
cine should be decisively abandoned.
Our proposal stands in contrast to an account of clin-
ical medicine as an applied science requiring a number
of specific competencies, some technoscientific, other
relational, moral, or vaguely “humane.” Engagement and
solicitude are not competencies. Rather, they are pro-
posed as an invitation to learn, through experience, the
ways of engagement, and thus become a practitioner
who embodies the ethos of medicine—what patients
look for in the chaos they are forced to navigate, the an-
chor point of a physician to whom they will matter.
Endnotes
1We did not include in the analyses issues related to the
participants’ specific experiences as patients-as-partners, ex-
cept where these were related to experiences of clinical
practice.
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2All interviews were conducted in French; the quota-
tions are our direct translations in English of the verba-
tim transcripts. Some of the written texts may appear to
have poor grammar; this is explained by the fact that we
endeavored to capture the prosody of the patients’
voices. We sometimes use italics to emphasize specific
moments relevant to the arguments made in the manu-
script. We have also modified a number of minor details
to ensure anonymity.
3Nathalie’s words echo Arthur Frank’s notion of the
“chaotic type” of illness narratives [24].
4Issues of translation of Heidegger’s terminology are
numerous and quite debatable. In this section, we mostly
follow Macquarrie and Robinson [16] and translate
“Besorge” by concern and “Fürsorge” by solicitude; how-
ever, we translate “Sorge” by preoccupation rather than
care, to avoid any confusion with care in a more general
sense, as in “health care”, or “cure versus care.”
5We believe that the intersubjective space opened by
“leaping-ahead” is close to what the psychoanalyst Don-
ald Winnicott [25] described as a “transitional space”,
but this goes beyond the scope of the present article.
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